Flexible Credibility: Conventional Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons

Introduction

Some uses for which the United States has historically reserved the right to use nuclear weapons may not be a credible threat to some adversaries. Conventional alternatives to nuclear weapons use may create a more flexible and credible response to a broader range of strategic problems.

Since the end of World War II, United States security policy has been to prevent the outbreak of major war by deterrence. The mainstay of strategic deterrence has been nuclear weapons, now embodied in the nuclear "triad" of manned bombers, land-based ICBMs, and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

Analysis and Conventional Alternatives

In order to deter an enemy from an undesirable course of action, a credible threat must be present. It is clear that nuclear weapons have offered valuable deterrence to general nuclear and major power war. It is less clear that nuclear weapons offer a credible response to anything much less than national survival.

New conventional systems offer capabilities that can substitute for nuclear weapons on some missions. Advances in munitions and guidance technology offer the United States strategic deterrence options beyond those provided by nuclear weapons alone.

Summary and Conclusions

A credibility gap exists between the threat of nuclear weapons and current conventional capability. A bullet that never fired is just extra weight in the cartridge belt. Similarly, a bullet that an opponent does not believe will ever be fired is an ineffective tool for deterrence.

Future advances in doctrine and technology promise to increase the effectiveness of conventional weapons as supplements and partial replacements for nuclear weapons in the deterrence mission, creating a more flexible and credible American strategic posture.