The prospect of war on the Korean peninsula is sobering. The danger is not just getting into a war, but getting into a war for which we are not prepared, either militarily, economically, or psychologically. Misperceptions have led nations to disastrous wars and will continue to do so.
While we hope that leaders will make rational decisions, experience tells us that it is likely that they will be mistaken in their judgement about an enemy's intentions and capabilities and that emotions will color decisions. Wars are rarely accidental or inevitable, but decisions based on faulty information can take states to the brink and over.
There are signs that the leaders of both the United States and North Korea are already mistaken in their perceptions of each other and have fundamental misunderstandings of each other's strategic goals. Those misperceptions and misunderstandings can lead to the most destructive war since World War II.
Robert Jervis, in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, observed that international relations scholars have done little to understand how states perceive each other. Two authors who have specifically studied the causes of war and made observations about misperceptions are John C. Stoessinger and Geoffrey Blainey.
First is the consistent belief that the conflict will be a short, decisive war. In nearly all cases in the past three centuries, leaders on at least one side of the conflict have been convinced that the war they advocate will be quick, victorious, and relatively inexpensive.
Second is a misreading of the character and intentions of the enemy. Understanding the real motives behind North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the Chinese motives in supporting North Korea is critical in finding a solution short of war.
Third, and perhaps most influential, is the misperception of the enemy's power. States that go to war generally do not agree on their relative power at the beginning of the conflict.
War on the Korean peninsula will be violent, bloody, expensive, and lengthy. The best way to start is to recognize that we are likely underestimating the enemy and overestimating our own capabilities.
Donald S. Inbody is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at Texas State University and holds a Ph.D. in government from the University of Texas at Austin. He served 28 years in the United States Navy, commanded USS Duluth (LPD-6), and retired with the rank of Captain. He is the author of The Soldier Vote: War, Politics, and the Ballot in America.
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Donald Inbody
Author, political scientist, naval historian, and amateur radio operator (ADØK).